ORAL COPULATION: A CONSTITUTIONAL
CURTAIN MUST BE DRAWN

INTRODUCTION
In relevant portions, California Penal Code Section 288 (a) states
that any persons participating in an act of copulating the mouth of
one person with the sexual organ of another is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not exceeding 15 years.' The statute does not distinguish between acts committed in private and acts
committed in public or acts committed by spouses and acts committed by persons not married to one another. Furthermore, this provision fails to provide for the affirmative defense of consent and
thus, it does contemplate the prosecution of both adult participants
in the same act, even if both parties consented to the act.
In the exercise of its police power, each state has the right to
2
enact laws to promote public health, safety, morals, and welfare.
Traditionally, it has been recognized that penal statutes proscribing
illicit sexual contacts constitute a legitimate and proper exercise of
that power.3 In support of the contention that Section 288(a) is a
valid exercise of its police power, the government has advanced
certain interests, e.g., the protection of the young from sexual assault, the protection of public decency, and the prevention of the
spread of venereal disease, which, if achieved by the statute, would
tend to promote public health, safety, morals and welfare. It is the
purpose of this article to determine whether these legitimate and
substantial interests are of such a compelling nature as to justify
the governmental infringement upon an individual's fundamental
right to privacy as protected by the penumbra of specific guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments as incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. In addition to, and in light of,
recent judicial expressions of opinions concerning separate and dis1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (a) (West 1972).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965)
curring).
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tinct constitutional issues, this article will additionally explore the
merits of the contention that Section 288 (a), since it is based largely
on Judeo-Christian principles of morality, is in violation of the Establishment-of-Religion Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Tim

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The Supreme Court of the United States, over many years, and
in a variety of decisions, has interpreted the Constitution to protect
rights relating to sex and child bearing, 4 marriage, 5 and child rearing.0 In 1964, in Griswold v. Connecticut,7 [hereinafter referred to
as Griswold] the Supreme Court located the source of "zones of
privacy" immune from governmental intrusion in the penumbras
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance" 8 and
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people. The
Court in Griswold, in light of the particular facts of the case before
it, couched the opinion in terms of marital privacy and concluded
that the State's regulation of the use of contraceptives violated defendants' right to privacy as protected by the Constitution. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg agreed that the concept of liberty protected those personal rights that are fundamental. He then
determined that the language and history of the Ninth Amendment
dictated that the concept of liberty is not so restricted so as to be
confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights and concluded
that,
[to hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deeprooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by
the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the
Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. 9
That the protected area of privacy accorded to husband and wife
includes sexual practices other than contraception has been recognized by various state and federal courts. The United States Court
of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 10 by interpreting the Griswold decision
as dictating that private, consensual, marital relations are protected
from regulation by the state through the use of a criminal penalty,
4. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
5. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
7. 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965).
8. Id. at 484.
9. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
10. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968).
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concluded that under Griswold, Indiana courts could not constitutionally interpret the Indiana sodomy statute as making private consensual physical relations between married persons a crime absent a
clear showing that the state had an interest in preventing such relations which outweighed the constitutional right to privacy.1 1 In
Buchanan v. Batchelor,'2 a three judge District Court recognized
that sodomy is such conduct which does not have the approval of the
majority of the people and which is probably offensive to the vast
,majority, but, in the absence of some demonstrable necessity, such
opinion is not sufficient reason for the state to encroach upon the
liberty of married persons in their private conduct.
In light of these recent federal and state court decisions it would
be proper to conclude that Section 288(a), as applied to atypical
sexual behavior's between consenting married individuals in private, is an unjustified invasion of the married individuals' consti14
tutional right to privacy.
Does this constitutional right of privacy announced in Griswold
inhere only in a member of a marital relationship, or does the Griswold rationale extend beyond the facts of that case so as to provide a constitutional right to privacy in sexual relations regardless
of marital status? Several Supreme Court decisions indicate that
the right does inhere in the individual, and not merely in the mari5
tal entity or its members. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,1
the Supreme Court concerned itself with the question of whether an Oklahoma statute, which provided for the sterilization of one criminal
and not another where both had been convicted of offenses which
were intrinsically of the same quality, was in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In concluding
that the statute was in violation of the Amendment, the Court held
that procreation is fundamental to the very existence and survival
11. Id. at 875.

12. 308 F. Supp. 729, 736 (N.D. Tex. 1970), judgment vacated on grounds
of federal abstention doctrine, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).

13. For purposes of this article, typical sexual behavior will be defined
as genital-to-genital intercourse.
14. See People v. Wilson, No. A109940 (Superior Court of California,
Los Angeles County) (1971), where Judge Landis concluded that Section
288(a) was unconstitutional as it applied to the private consensual conduct
of a married couple where such conduct harmed neither party nor any third
person.
15. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

of the race without making any distinction as to a married or single
person's right to procreate. 16 In Stanley v. Georgia,17 the Court
recognized that the state retains broad power to regulate obscenity,
but the Court stated, "[f] or also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one's privacy."' 8 On this basis, the
Court concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited that power from extending to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.
In yet another line of cases, the courts have seemingly recognized
that this constitutional right of privacy does in fact inhere in the
individual, rather than solely in a member of a marital entity. The
Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,' 9 determined that the right of privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. Earlier, the California Supreme
Court, in People v. Belous, 20 recognized that the fundamental right

of the woman to choose whether to bear children followed from
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
California's repeated acknowledgement of a right of privacy or
liberty in matters relating to marriage, family, and sex. Thus, the
court reasoned that a state statute which regulated the ability of a
doctor to perform an abortion was a direct infringement of constitutional rights which could not be justified where the abortion was
sought during the first trimester. The significance of the rulings in
each of these "abortion decisions" is that the courts found that the
privacy interest of a woman with regard to the control of her body
2
in reproduction did not turn on the marital status of the woman. 1
Implicit in these decisions is a willingness on the part of the courts
to take cognizance of the fact that the right to sexual privacy encompasses the right of the individual to control the use and function of his or her own body.
Finally, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,22 the Supreme Court, in an attempt to dispel any doubt as to whether the right of privacy was
limited to the concept of "marital privacy," firmly established that
the right of privacy inhered in the individual by stating:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an inde-

16. Id. at 541.

17. 394U.S. 557 (1969).
18. Id. at 564.
19. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
20. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 359 (1969).
21. In fact, the woman seeking the abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), was unmarried.
22. 405 U.S.438 (1972).
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pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion

....

23

In Eisenstadt,the Court was concerned with whether there existed
a recognizable state interest or ground of difference that rationally
explained the different treatment accorded married and unmarried
persons under the Massachussetts distribution-of-contraception law.
After determining that a recognizable difference did not exist, the
Court then reasoned that, under the rationale of Griswold, the
right of privacy inhered in the individual, regardless of his or her
marital status; whatever the rights of the individual might be, the
rights must be the same for the unmarried and married alike. Thus,
by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who were similarly situated, the Massachussetts statute vio24
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While it is true, however, that the Eisenstadt decision literally rests
on the Equal Protection Clause, analytically, the equal protection
argument is an extension of a finding that the statute was in violation of the Due Process Clause. Any statute which violates the due
process rights of a class of similarly situated persons necessarily
violates the Equal Protection Clause when applied to only part of
that class. In Eisenstadt then, the Court not only recognized the
fact that Griswold dictated that the fundamental right to privacy
in matters relating to sex, as protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, inhered in a member of an existing
marital relationship, but also that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment required that this
fundamental right to sexual privacy be granted to unmarried persons. The importance of this extension of the Griswold decision is
that a broad regulation of sexual conduct such as Section 288(a)
cannot be saved constitutionally by excluding from its scope only the
private consensual acts between individuals in a marital relation25
ship.
23. Id. at 453.
24. Id.
25. See People v. Schwarz, No. A282165 (Superior Court of California,
Los Angeles County) (1972), where on similar reasoning, Judge Dell concluded that Section 288(a) must fall under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See also, People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207,

RIGHT TO PRIVACY V. STATE INTEREST

The right to privacy in matters relating to marriage, procreation,
and sexual activity is a fundamental right.2 6 Although the courts
do not sit as a super-legislative body to determine the desirability
or propriety of laws enacted by the legislature, 27 the courts have consistently held that the Constitution requires that where the exercise of fundamental rights is inhibited, the state may prevail only
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. 28
Although one Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
has already expressed doubt as to whether a state may constitutionally assert an interest in regulating any sexual act between consenting adults, 29 and dicta to the same effect can be found in the
decisions of both state and federal courts, 30 it would seem reasonable
to assume that California could assert certain legitimate interests
in the regulation of atypical sexual activity between consenting
adults. The scope of inquiry then focuses on whether these interests are of such a nature so as to outweigh the individual's right to
sexual privacy as guaranteed and protected by the Constitution.
The interests most often advanced for the retention of criminal
sanctions for the sexual act of oral copulation are the protection of
public decency,3 1 the protection of the young from forcible sexual
assault, and the prevention of the spread of venereal disease.3 2 Al105 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1973), where the court concluded that Section 288(a), as
applied to consenting adults, was not an unconstitutional invasion of the
individual's fundamental right of sexual privacy. However, in light of the
court's cavalier disregard of the implications of the Griswold, Eisenstadt,
et al. decisions, and the application of a rigid notion of stare decisis in
which the court relied heavily on the precedent set by a California case
decided before Griswold, this decision should not be considered a good
precedent for Section 288(a)'s constitutionality.
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
28. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 236-37, 466 P.2d 244, 253-54, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20,
29-30 (1970).
See the court's discussion, in Castro, of the compelling interest doctrine at n.24.
29. LaRue v. California, 409 U.S. 109, 132 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. See In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 929 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Harris v.
State, 457 P.2d 638, 646-47 (Ala. 1969).
31. In this context, the protection of the public decency is intended to
mean the protection of the public from exposure to indecency rather than
the building of the character of the members of the public. The character
of the citizen is not a legitimate matter of public concern unless it is serving as the means by which an ultimate legitimate state objective is to be
achieved.
32. See In re Labady, 362 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v.
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though these considerations are recognized as valid state interests,
this alone should not be sufficient for the statute to withstand a
constitutional attack. Even though governmental purposes be legitimate and substantial, those purposes cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
33
can be more narrowly achieved.
By definition, public decency cannot be offended by private consensual acts between adults. If the particular challenged conduct
is public in nature it is reasonable to conclude, in light of the threat
of harm to the community, that the state does have a compelling
interest in the regulation of this conduct which outweighs the individual's right to privacy. In addition, the individual will be left
with the reasonable alternative of choosing to engage in this conduct in private. Therefore, the government interest in protecting
public decency can be achieved by alternate means which would not
affect the individual's fundamental right to privacy, i.e. a statute
which makes criminal the public display of the act of oral copulation or the public solicitation of the act. However, the broad scope
of Section 288 (a) includes conduct which is private in nature and
which does not result in the exposure of indecency to the public.
Under these circumstances, the right of the individual to sexual
privacy outweighs the state interest in the need to control such
34
activity.
Although it is true that the protection of the young from harmful sexual activity is a substantial and legitimate state interest,
Section 288(a) does not restrict itself to the regulation of activity
"forced" upon a minor but rather, the scope of the statute is such
'as to permit the state to regulate the constitutionally protected activity of consenting adults. A report made in England and later
submitted to Parliament3 5 pointed out that a man who has homoMoses, 41 U.S.L.W. 2298 (1972); these cases set forth the interests advanced
by the state for the regulation of sodomy.
33. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).

34. See In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) for similar
language. See also A.L.I. Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)
at 277 which provides, "No harm to the secular interest of the community
is involved in atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult
partners."
35. Great Britain Comm. on Homosexual Offences and ProstitutionReport, C.M.D. No. 247 (1957), also known as the Wolfenden Report.

sexual relations with an adult partner seldom turns to boys, and
vice versa.3 0 Schur, in his book on homosexuality,3 7 emphasized that
it is not clear why elimination of the legal ban on the private acts
of consenting adults should increase the dangers of seduction. He
concluded that since acts with like-minded adults would become
38
somewhat freer, acts with minors might be expected to decrease.
It is also noteworthy to point out that several existing provisions of
the California Penal Code have attempted to achieve this state objective of the protection of the young from harmful sexual 'activity by making unlawful the commission of lewd acts upon a child
under fourteen,3 9 carnal abuse of a female under ten,40 the annoyance or the molestation of -achild under eighteen, 41 the abduction of
a woman,4 2 the seduction or taking of a female for the purposes og
prostitution,43 and sexual intercourse with a female under the age
44
of eighteen.
The primary health interest advanced by the State in support of
Section 288(a) is the prevention of the spread of venereal disease.
To date, the government has been unable to offer the slightest scintilla of evidence that the incidence of venereal disease is higher
among those who engage in atypical sexual acts than among those
who do not. In fact, it has been found that nothing in present
enforcement practices holds any potential for mitigating venereal
disease among those who commit such acts. 45 However, even if the
government could produce evidence sufficient to persuade the courts
that atypical sexual activity is a major cause of the spread of venereal disease, it is readily apparent that the state could just as effectively control this danger by resorting to reasonable alternative
methods which would not infringe upon the individual's right to
sexual privacy. Public health information distribution and treatment centers would seem to be a more satisfactory solution to the
problem.
Tim ESTABLISHMENT-OF-RELIGION CLAUsE

In Western civilization, the repressive treatment of atypical sexual behavior as a crime is a direct legacy of the Judeo-Christian
36. Id. at 45-6.

37. Scmu, CnvRss WrrouT VicTIMs (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1965).
38. Id. at 111.
39. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (West 1972).
40. CAL. PEN. CODE § 645 (West 1972).
41. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(a) (West 1972).
42. CAL. PEN. CODE § 265 (West 1972).
43. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 266, 266(a) (West 1972).
44. CAL. PEN. CODE § 261.5 (West 1972).

45. United States v. Moses, 41 U.S.L.W. 2298 (1972).
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view of sodomy as a sin. The very term "sodomy" comes from the

biblical account of the destruction of the city of Sodom.45 The
most forceful biblical proscriptions against homosexuality are:
"Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an
abomination" 47 and "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with
a woman, both of them have committed an abomination. They
48
shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.1
Activities involving atypical sexual behavior were not a crime according to early common law, and jurisdiction of these offenses was
left to the ecclesiastical courts.49 It was not until the sixteenth
century that this form of activity became an offense cognizable in
the civil courts, but the religious character of the offense continued
to be recognized.50
Recently some courts have adopted this line of reasoning in challenging the validity of statutes which regulated this form of adult
sexual behavior. The Supreme Court of Alaska, in ruling the
state sodomy statute unconstitutional for vagueness,5 ' cited the
religious history and background of the crime of sodomy as a possible ground for an attack on its constitutionality based on the Establishment-of-Religion clause. In a recent New Mexico case 5 2 a dissenting judge stated,
The sodomy statute reflects a Judeo-Christian principle ....
Sodomy is deemed sinful and wrongful as a matter of theology
The prohibition is religious in origin and no secular justification exists for enforcement of this religious principle beyond the
areas set forth in the Model Penal Code .... Neither the legislature nor the courts have the power to impose with ecclesiastical
fury religious principles upon ordinary innocent adults.53
This line of attack has, arguably, the following constitutional
basis. In Everson v. Board of Education,54 the Supreme Court of
46. GENEsIs 19.
47. LEvrricus 18:22.
48. LIxIcus 20:13.
49. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
(W. Lewis, Ed. 1900).
50. Id. at § 215.

Co1mviENTARiEs ON THE LAws or ENGLAND

§ 216.

51. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648-49 (Ala. 1969).

52. State v. Trejo, 494 P.2d 173 (N.M. 1972). See also A.L.I. Model
Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) at 277 which states that this area of
private morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities.
53. State v. Trejo, 494 P.2d 173, 176 (N.ML 1972).
54. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).

the United States determined that the Establishment Clause meant
at least that neither a state nor the federal government can set up
a church and neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. By regulating atypical sexual behavior pursuant to Section 288(a), the State of California has passed a law which prefers the Judeo-Christian view
toward this form of behavior. In McGowan v. Maryland,5 5 the
Court declared that a law violates the Establishment Clause if its
purposes are to use the State's coercive power to aid religion.
Again, the argument can be made that Section 288(a) is a means
by which the State is aiding the Judeo-Christian religions. Finally,
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 6 the Court reaffirmed these prior tests
and then went further by stating that a statute violates the Establishment Clause unless it satisfies all of the following requirements: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
(2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and, (3) the statute must not foster an
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.5 7 In light of the
religious and historical information which has been set forth above,
it would seem reasonable to conclude that the principal and/or primary effect of Section 288(a) is to advance Judeo-Christian beliefs
and foster an excessive governmental entanglement with JudeoChristian principles.
The above attack based upon the Establishment Clause is fallacious. The Establishment Clause cases cited above, with the exception of McGowan, were concerned with the use of tax proceeds
for purposes of promoting religious education and are not apposite. In McGowan the Court indicated that, insofar as police statutes are concerned, they will not be invalidated under the Establishment Clause unless they serve no valid secular purpose or serve
58
one only by means of compelling specific religious practices.
Moreover, if a statute serves no valid secular purpose, then it will
be deemed to be unconstitutional regardless of whether it serves
a religious purpose. If, on the other hand, a valid secular purpose
exists, the statute will not be invalidated simply because it coincides with religious tenets of some or all religions. 59 Furthermore,
it is not constitutionally proper to use relevant religious and historical information as the basis of a contention that, since this statute
is so substantially based on Judeo-Christian notions of sexual moral55. 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961).
56. 403 U.s. 602 (1971).

57. Id. at 612-13.

58. 366 U.S. 420, 441-45 (1961).
59. Id. at 442.
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ity, then it must logically follow that this same statute does not
serve any valid secular purpose. The religious origin of this statute is thus constitutionally irrelevant.
LIvITATIONS ON THE EXTENT OF STATE REGULATION

The arguments have already been made in support of the contention that Section 288(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it is
an attempt by the State to regulate atypical sexual behavior between consenting adults in private and as such constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on the individual's fundamental right
of privacy in matters relating to sex. Logically then, the next step
is to inquire as to whether the state can constitutionally regulate
any atypical sexual conduct involving consenting adults, and if so,
to what extent. In one of the companion cases involved in the recent landmark obscenity decisions, 60 Paris Adult Theatre v. Lewis
Slaton, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a majority of the
Court, stated that "for us to say that our Constitution incorporates
the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is
always beyond state regulation, that [sic] is a step we are unable
to take."6 1 However, Mr. Burger did acknowledge the fact that
this fundamental right of privacy is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship, 62 and as
such extended to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room,
or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy in63
volved.
At what point can the state begin to regulate this form of conduct? It would appear reasonable to conclude that, at a minimum,
the state could regulate the commission of atypical sexual behavior
between consenting adults when the activity is conducted on commercial premises open to the public and within the plain view of
the public. 64 The real problem develops when we consider the situation where two consenting adults are engaging in atypical sexual
60. 41 U.S.L.W. 4935 (1973).
61. Id. at 4941.
62. Id. at 4940, n.13.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4941. See also the language of Chief Justice Burger at 4940,
n.13 where he states that "[o]bviously there is no necessary or legitimate
expectation of privacy which would extend to marital intercourse on a
street corner ......

behavior, not in the confines of a bedroom in a home or in a hotel
room, but rather in circumstances such as a parked car in a deserted
drive-in movie theatre, or in a sleeping bag in the middle of a secluded forest, or in a small boat in an area of water not close to
the public docking area. In United States v. Doe,6 5 the Court was
confronted with this type of problem. There, the two defendants
had engaged in atypical sexual behavior in a secluded area of a
public park. The Court concluded that the constitutional right
of privacy extends to individuals engaging in atypical sexual behavior in a quasi-public area (where the activity is not conducted
within the plain view of the public and where no member of the
public is harmed by the activity). This author endorses that
Court's extension of the constitutionally protected zone of privacy
which strikes an appropriate balance between the important competing private and public interests involved.
CONCLusIoNq

Since Griswold, there has not only developed a considerable body
of legal precedent in support of the contention that the scope of
laws pertaining to sexual morality should be limited; there has also
developed a considerable change of attitude on the part of the public in matters relating to sex as well as the appearance of various
studies which have questioned the states' ability to regulate this
form of human behavior. It is the hope of this author that the
Legislature or, if necessary, the courts, will limit Section 288(a) to
bring it into harmony with the spirit of the Constitution and the
mores of the people.
ROBERT

65. 12 Calm. L. RPTR. 2531 (1973).
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